The Derailed Policies of the ECB by Georg Milbradt
CESifo Forum 2012 43
Special Issue
THE DERAILED POLICIES OF
THE ECB
GEORG MILBRADT*
Target balances and the euro crisis
The problems revealed a few months ago by Hans-
Werner Sinn1 of the Target balances between the ECB
and national central banks (NCBs), especially the
Bundesbank, on the one side, and the NCBs of the
peripheral countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal Spain,
and recently Italy (GIPS countries), on the other, has
made clear that there are serious institutional weak-
nesses in the Eurosystem and significant negative
developments in the euro area that in terms of their
scope and dangers go even further than the sovereign
debt crisis and the rescue plan constructed by the euro
countries, both of which are the subject of public con-
troversy (first Greek rescue plan, EFSM, EFSF).
Triggered by the massive deficit in the Greek state bud-
get that emerged into public view in late 2010, the polit-
ical and economic interest focused mainly on excessive
debt financing in Greece and Portugal, the housing
bubble in Ireland and Spain, the associated effects on
the banking systems in the euro area and the reaction
of the financial markets. The policy measures to avert
an alleged second ‘Lehman crisis’ are well-known: the
provision of a rescue plan for Greece, Ireland and
Portugal and perhaps for Spain and Italy, with certain
requirements for fiscal and economic policy and the
assumption of bank risks by taxpayers. The excessive
public and private debt, however, is only the tip of the
iceberg of a deep-seated balance of payments crisis
within the euro area as a result of external economic
abuses that were largely unnoticed before the crisis and
that had arisen since the introduction of the euro.
The Target balances are a kind of ‘missing link’ that
make apparent the relationship between the publical-
ly discussed sovereign debt and banking crisis of the
GIPS countries and the external imbalances that have
arisen in the form of balance of payments crises in the
euro area. European policy-makers do not seem to
have fully grasped the actual extent and causes of the
crisis, since up to now the measures have not been
suitable for solving the real problems. To some extent
they are even counterproductive. The massive external
imbalances are only mentioned in passing if at all and
play no or only a very minor role in the rescue mea-
sures taken thus far.
In the public discussion, the term ‘euro crisis’ is pri-
marily used, which seems to suggest that the euro as a
currency is in jeopardy. Fortunately, we have not yet
had a crisis that involves excessive inflation or
exchange rate depreciation2 but a crisis of the curren-
cy area and the monetary union, as some countries are
not willing or able to shoulder the duties and conse-
quences that come with a monetary union, and since
doubts have arisen as to whether this will improve in
the foreseeable future. There are also serious construc-
tion defects in the monetary union and glaring weak-
nesses in the implementation of the rules. However,
there are inflation risks in the medium term if the
monetisation of government debt is not halted.
The failures that led, on the one hand, to massive
imbalances between countries within the eurozone in
the area of foreign trade, the private capital flows and
competitiveness, and, on the other hand, excessive
public and private debt in the GIPS countries are a
direct result of European Monetary Union. They did
not occur in the previous system of national curren-
cies with more or less flexible exchange rates, since a
policy of exchange rate stabilisation via intervention
in currency markets would, with the great extent of
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1 The first public statement dated from the end of February 2011
(Sinn 2011), which triggered a debate among experts in Germany
and abroad; the discussion helped allay initial misunderstandings
and misinterpretations. For the latest presentation of the Target
arguments, see Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and the literature
cited there.
2 The average inflation of the euro was lower than in the period of
the deutschmark (DM), and the euro has become more expensive
against the US dollar. However, this assertion must be seen in the
proper perspective. It is problematic to compare the DM period with
that of the euro, since the global economic challenges were very dif-
ferent. Due to the obvious weakness of the dollar and the US econ-
omy, a look at the dollar alone is not sufficiently informative.
Comparing the euro with the Swiss franc, which has always been
regarded as a haven of stability, the performance of the euro is not
quite as impressive. The same applies to the comparison with the
Nordic currencies outside the euro area.real economic imbalances, have quickly reached its
limits and would have brought about exchange rate
realignments.
Today’s problems can thus be causally attributed to the
euro; the global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 that
began in the United States only made them apparent.
The constant reference to evil speculators, biased rat-
ing agencies and the call for restraining the interna-
tional financial markets is neither a sufficient expla-
nation of the problems nor a useful strategy. It serves
only to divert attention from the real problems of the
eurozone and in particular from the design flaws for
which policy-makers are responsible and from other
wrong policy decisions at the national and European
levels. The impression arises that some policy-makers
have not taken note of, or are not willing to take note
of, the inner mechanics of a monetary union and the
potential dangers; instead they look for scapegoats
that they can present to the general public. 
In retrospect, the first euro years appear idyllic. One
can compare it with sailing in fine weather, which is
possible with a second-rate boat, inadequate equip-
ment and an inexperienced team. Policy-makers and
the ECB were living with a false sense of security,
even though the storm was approaching. When it
finally broke and the suitability of boat, crew and
equipment were put to the test, the inherent weak-
ness and lack of preparation for possible dangers
became apparent. A monetary union with strict rules
consistently enforced had not been created, and now
a heavy price had to be paid. Since then, we have wit-
nessed constantly incoherent and often counterpro-
ductive quick fixes that only undermine confidence
in politicians and institutions. 
Advantages and disadvantages of monetary union
At the latest, since the discussion triggered by the later
Nobel laureate Robert Mundell in 1961 on optimal
currency areas, the economic advantages but also the
disadvantages and weaknesses of monetary unions
are widely known. Since the euro was introduced for
an economically suboptimal and highly inhomoge-
neous area and the monetary union was regarded as
less an economic than a political project in order to
achieve the political unification of Europe or even to
force it in through the back door, it was particularly
important to be aware of the inherent dangers and
mistakes, and counteract them through meaningful
institutional safeguards and wise policies.
We know from economic history that all monetary
unions between equal partners3 have failed because
the centrifugal forces in the emergence of very differ-
ent economic developments in sub-regions and the
institutional disincentives were not gotten under con-
trol. The advantages of monetary union are undisput-
ed and were constantly stated even before the start of
European Monetary Union and still are today. The
main pro-arguments are:
￿ A monetary union reduces the transaction costs
through the elimination of currency risks.
￿ It eliminates the location disadvantages, particu-
larly for smaller sub-regions.
￿ It allows these regions to receive better conditions
for financing investments via a large, common cap-
ital market.
￿ It facilitates economic integration.
￿ It promotes the division of labour.
￿ And it can thus lead to higher overall growth and
prosperity in the currency area, especially in the
smaller sub-regions.
In addition there are specific policy arguments: 
￿ The euro should strengthen a European sense of
belonging together.
￿ It should enable a real political union with a strong
European government and an influential parlia-
mentary.4
￿ It should replace the Bundesbank with its domi-
nant influence on monetary policy in Europe with
a common central bank on which all euro coun-
tries would have equal influence.5
￿ It would irreversibly tie reunited Germany to the
European Union.6
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3 These do not include monetary unions between a dominant partner,
who has the undisputed leading role and who dominates the currency
area in practice, and one or more subordinate partners who can only
adapt but who have no decisive influence on monetary policy in the
union as a whole. These include for example the former Belgian-
Luxembourg Monetary Union, the still-existing currency union
between Switzerland and Lichtenstein and the monetary union
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR lasting three
months in the summer of 1990, as well as monetary unions with
dependent areas, especially colonies or post-colonial countries. It is
especially interesting again today to read the one-sided and strict rules
of the German-German treaty on economic, monetary and social
union of 1990 with regard to the Bundesbank and the economic and
fiscal-policy competence of the GDR and to compare these with the
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 that was negotiated shortly thereafter.
4 The Bundesbank and German policy-makers were of precisely the
opposite view in the discussion about the Werner Plan from the late
1960s to 1990. The monetary union was seen as the culmination of
the political union and not as an instrument for achieving the same.
The historical model was the introduction of the Mark as a common
currency in 1873 after German unification in 1871 and not earlier
during the period of the Zollverein.
5 In particular, politicians from the previously soft-currency countries
wanted to achieve a monetary policy that was less stability-oriented.
6 Some saw in the monetary union a political price that Germany
should pay France in return for unification. The danger that a reuni-
fied and strengthened Germany might pursue its future outside
European integration or might seek to dominate Europe would thus
be counteracted.CESifo Forum 2012 45
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In the political and to some extent also in the eco-
nomic discussion, the disadvantages and dangers of a
monetary union usually played only a minor role:
￿ In a monetary union the participating countries
lose competency in the area of monetary policy,
which is an especially large problem for inhomoge-
neous sub-regions. For this reason, a high degree of
flexibility of prices and wages in particular down-
wards is needed as well as migration from the
depressed to the booming regions and a greater
stability-policy orientation of fiscal policy that
remains a matter of national competence.
￿ Debts under a common currency are in fact foreign
currency debt, since the participating countries
have lost the right to create their own money. This,
however, increases the insolvency risk for sovereign
debt, a risk which, from an investor’s perspective,
counteracts the positive effect of an elimination of
exchange-rate risks.
￿ As a last resort to compensate for various develop-
ments and maintain a monetary union there remain
only transfer payments, which are not oriented on
the different wealth or per-capita income of the
countries and which could be part of a meaningful
financial compensation, but which are paid by the
rule-abiding, adaptable and willing countries to
those who cannot or do not intend7 to meet the eco-
nomic requirements of the monetary union.8
The very measures taken to stabilise the monetary
union and the resulting danger of an extensive liabili-
ty union with uncontrolled transfer flows also poses a
significant political risk:
￿ The moral hazard effect in the recipient countries,
the shift of political responsibility to the donor
countries and Europe, Europe as a scapegoat for its
own mistakes.
￿ The softening of the conditionality of aid, since
under the present constitution of Europe it will not
be possible in the long term to treat a member
country as a protectorate, in which national parlia-
ments and governments are made subordinate to
democratically insufficiently legitimised European
bodies in Brussels.9 Greece cannot be governed
from Brussels!
￿ The increasing alienation of European nations that
may even extend to open strife and damage to the
European idea.
The hopes and promises of German policy-makers at
the time of the introduction of the euro were to
exclude undesirable developments in the monetary
union through institutional arrangements. Here, a key
role was played by: 
￿ the stability criteria,
￿ the mutual exclusion of liability and
￿ an ECB based on the model of the Bundesbank
with far-reaching political independence and a
‘depoliticized’ currency.10
The history of the so-called Maastricht criteria and their
sanction mechanism is well-known. They were insuffi-
cient, were weakened and made subject to political
opportunity. The proposed reforms will do nothing to
change this in principle. It is not to be expected that the
far-reaching domestic and external economic mistakes
will be corrected with more stringent and extended rules
and that these mistakes will be avoided in future.
The mutual exclusion of liability was stood on its
head in the rescue packages. The corrective function
of the capital markets to force economic adjustments
via interest rate differentials will continue to be weak-
ened or even eliminated. The problem of external
imbalances will thus not be confronted. The policy of
the ECB to bail out countries and banking systems
through the purchase of the government bonds of the
GIPS countries without quality collateral has the
same negative effect. The events of recent months
have made this clear. It was not the stability criteria,
the sanction mechanisms or even the public pro-
nouncements and decisions of the ECB that brought
about the long-postponed measures to consolidate
and strengthen competitiveness in Italy or Spain but
rising interest rates on the capital markets.
Current account deficits and capital imports after the
introduction of the euro 
The interest rates on government securities of the
euro countries initially converged about to the
7 Liable under the rescue plan are even relatively poor countries such
as Slovakia and Estonia for the much richer Ireland and the still rel-
atively wealthier Greece and Portugal. Since at least in the case of
Greece, sooner or later direct or indirect transfers will be paid, poor
countries will be paying to a richer one. This has little to do with the
conventional understanding of solidarity and compensation.
8 Unsound public finances are not the sole cause. Just as much
responsibility is borne by a non-productivity-oriented wage policy,
which affects the competitiveness of an economy, and excessive pri-
vate and public consumption, excessive private debt and an insuffi-
ciently regulated banking sector.
9 The constitutional quantum leap to a federal Europe, which is need-
ed to solve the problem, with a strong government and a powerful par-
liament on a democratic basis instead of the current more cooperative
structures, seems to me to be an illusion for the foreseeable future.
10 See the insightful article by Issing (2011).German level as a result of the euro, because the
exchange rate risk disappeared and because the mar-
kets undervalued or did not take seriously the
increased risk of bankruptcy brought about by the
monetary union because they did not believe that the
no-bail out clause would be enforced, which in retro-
spect was not such a wrong assessment. Added to this
was the fact that the bank supervisory authorities
rated government securities as fundamentally risk-
free, thus giving them a competitive advantage so that
the banks did not need to take precautions regarding
additional capital reserves, which ran contrary to the
so often proclaimed financial stability.
Since the markets assessed the risk of bank failures as
extremely low, there was a widespread convergence of
interest rates in the euro area, which, as H.-W. Sinn
has argued, made possible a massive capital inflow to
the GIPS countries, especially from Germany, and to
a growing current account deficit of these countries.
If the foreign capital had flowed primarily into pro-
ductivity-enhancing investments, such as direct invest-
ments by German companies, no objections could be
raised as this would have brought about growth and
competitive stimulus in the GIPS countries, which
would have allowed these countries to sustainably ser-
vice the capital that had flowed in; the capital markets
in these countries were not very effective before mon-
etary union.
However, policy-makers and the ECB tolerated over-
sized current account deficits which financed the
additional public and private consumption or bad
investments and real estate bubbles. This went hand in
hand with wage-price increases, which undermined
the competitiveness before the crisis and made an
improvement in the current account balance difficult or
even impossible. The economic models of the GIPS
states and their above-average growth were based on a
continuous import of private capital for unproductive
purposes, which was unrealistic.
Lasting and disproportionate external deficits, howev-
er, are an existential danger in a monetary union11
since a monetary devaluation to correct such a devel-
opment is no longer available. Neither national gov-
ernments nor the bank supervisors took action
against such a dangerous development; governments
even assisted this development in part through spend-
ing programmes financed by an excessive expansion
of national debt, and succumbed to the illusion of
lasting prosperity on credit, because this was extreme-
ly beneficial for domestic policy and for electoral pur-
poses. From a national perspective, this is under-
standable but short-sighted.12
The European institutions, notably the ECB did little
to counter this trend. Although an interest rate policy
differentiated by regions is not possible in a monetary
union, no direct counter measures were taken, for
example  via fiscal policy, which largely remained a
national competency, via competition enhancing
structural policies or by a stricter banking supervi-
sion. Since also no public warnings were issued at
European level, we can assume that in general the
dangers were underestimated. The creditor countries,
in turn, basked in their own export successes.13 Even
economists did not see the gathering storm. Quite
obviously there was an insufficient awareness of the
precise interlinkages and the extent of the danger.14
The beginning balance of payments crisis and the role
of the ECB
The global financial crisis changed the behaviour of
investors from mid-2007, as the analysis of Sinn and
Wollmerhäuser (2011) clearly shows. Risks were
examined more closely and critically. The capital
inflows to the GIPS countries stopped and were later
replaced in part by flows in the opposite direction:
repatriation of capital and capital flight. This created
a classic balance of payments problem that we are
familiar with from countless cases in the past.
In itself such a development in a functioning mone-
tary union would have to lead to an albeit very painful
process of normalisation and the disappearance of
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11 Unless they are offset by permanent transfers.
12 It could also have been a well-thought-out strategy of national
governments to make subsequent transfer payments necessary.
13 The tendency of German politicians and the public to one-sidedly
measure the success of economic policies in terms of export surplus-
es has certainly contributed. This reminds me of the behaviour of
some small construction companies in eastern Germany after reuni-
fication which tried, without taking the creditworthiness of their
clients into consideration, to obtain and fill as many orders as possi-
ble, and which later fell into considerable difficulties if the clients did
not pay. The sale of goods and services on credit – an export surplus
is nothing else – only makes sense for the economy as a whole if you
receive valuable claims or profitable assets. Otherwise, one has only
produced gifts. Since capital exports and trade surpluses usually
occur for different business entities, in microeconomic terms an
export surplus is still worthwhile. If the claims from capital exports
are not serviced, a microeconomic damage occurs for the capital
exporter or the taxpayer if the latter has guaranteed the capital
export. The aggregate balance of such a transaction is negative.
What has happened is that gifts to foreign countries have been pro-
duced, and money and effort spend on this. For the exporter, this has
the effect of an export subsidy.
14 Certainly some of the obvious problems in Greece were seen early
on; they could not be overlooked. They were tolerated politically and
regarded as insignificant.CESifo Forum 2012 47
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current account deficits. In the absence of private cap-
ital inflows, a current account deficit can only be
financed for a certain time by selling off one’s own
assets, and then, ceteris paribus,15 central-bank money
flows from the deficit countries to the surplus coun-
tries. This in turn, as in the case of the gold standard,
leads to a contraction of economic activity, in the
ideal case to a rapid adjustment downwards of prices
and wages, a reduction in imports and an increase in
exports. A solution of devaluation, as in the Bretton
Woods system, or with flexible exchange rates is not
possible, unless a departure from the monetary union
and a re-nationalisation of monetary policy is
allowed.16
In this situation the ECB allowed or even actively
aimed at the supplying of the private banking systems
in the deficit countries with sufficient central bank
money (created in these countries) to settle the balance
of payments deficits via the Target system. This com-
pensated for the lack of private capital inflows as well
as capital repatriation and later the capital flight, by
which a painful contraction of the economies and,
ultimately, a reduction of current account deficits were
prevented. The Target balances that arose this way ren-
dered ineffective the last remaining convergence mech-
anisms in the European Monetary Union.
Whether policy-makers were aware of this at the
beginning of the development in autumn 2007 is not
known. Perhaps they assumed or hoped that these
were only temporary spikes that are not uncommon
in the case of settlement balances. The underlying
problem seems to have been overlooked initially.
After the Lehman crisis in autumn 2008 when eco-
nomic stabilisation and recovery of the banking sys-
tems were correctly given absolute political priority,
there was even a certain justification for this
approach; it would certainly not have been appropri-
ate to tackle the balance of payments crisis in addi-
tion to the global economic and financial crisis at the
same time. This facilitated the further increase of the
Target balances by means of the expansionary mon-
etary policy utilised by the ECB. 
To the extent, however, that the immediate problems
such as the Lehman crisis in the banking sector were
dealt with and (thanks to shrewd financial and mone-
tary policies) the recession was also overcome, there
was no need for a justification of the further growth
of the Target balances. However, this was the point at
which these balances should have been reduced. 
Instead of doing this, the ECB and NCBs continued
their policy and financed the balance of payments
problems in the GIPS states17 through central bank
money creation.18 In addition, they lowered the
requirements on the quality of the collateral
required by banks. Thus the ECB increasingly
financed the GIPS banking systems and assumed
banking risks on a large scale. As with the beginning
of the Greek crisis the solution of the sovereign debt
problems become increasingly urgent, the ECB
called for rescue packages from the other euro coun-
tries, which were indeed granted in May 2011. This
pioneering role of the ECB is an indication that at
least partially it recognised the problem of its policy.
The Target balances were nothing more than unoffi-
cial rescue packages for the affected economies and
banking systems, a kind of ECB overdraft that was
to be replaced by the official rescue packages of the
euro countries. 
Of course, from the perspective of the deficit coun-
tries the loans via the Target balances are much more
attractive than the loans via the official rescue pack-
ages, since the latter are granted almost automatical-
ly without complicated application procedures and
testing, come with no obligations and are provided
at a favourable interest rate. Instead of formally bor-
rowing money from the rescue funds in order to
undertake the stabilisation of their own banking sys-
tems, it was and is much more convenient to let the
ECB deal with the problem of bank stabilisation. It
has thus not been possible to reduce the Target bal-
ances and replace them with measures that make
public the liability and the extent of assistance. In
addition, government securities of the GIPS states
were purchased in violation of treaties and statutes
in order to ‘reassure’ the markets and to avoid
alleged defects of monetary policy. This was not
about monetary policy in the strict sense but finan-
cial market stability and public finance. The interest
rate differentials in the eurozone were natural reac-
tions of the markets to mistakes and wrong political
15 Here a monetary policy is assumed that results in no additional
money creation in the deficit countries in comparison to the equilib-
rium situation.
16 Through temporary assistance or permanent transfers of the other
members of the monetary union, the lacking private capital imports
can be replaced by public funds and so the balance of payments
problem can be solved in the short term or permanently. The rescue
packages now play this role.
17 The graphs of Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011, 40) suggest that in
the case of Greece and Portugal, the Target balances primarily
financed the current account deficits and for Ireland repatriation and
capital flight, whereas in Spain private capital inflows were still able
to finance in part the current account deficit.
18 The amount of central-bank money flowing into the surplus coun-
tries was neutralised by counter operations there, so that no infla-
tionary effect was touched off in the eurozone. This, however, limit-
ed the money creation possibilities there, ceteris paribus.decisions in the affected countries and not defects of
monetary policy. The real problems of the ECB’s
interventions were not solved but only postponed
and ultimately made more expensive.
The politicization of the ECB
The monetary policy of the ECB is now far removed
from the tradition of the old Bundesbank. The
financing of balance of payment problems via
money creation in exchange for inferior collateral19
and the financing of sovereign debt through the pur-
chase of securities on the market have little in com-
mon with traditional monetary policy. With its res-
cuing of banks and governments, the ECB, without
a mandate, has communitarised national banks and
sovereign risk at the expense of the ECB’s owners
and ultimately, their taxpayers, which is not the task
the ECB has been given. The primary task of the
ECB, namely, monetary policy, is becoming more
and more subordinate to rescuing governments and
banking systems and the financing of the external
imbalances.
Also, the composition of the ECB’s governing bod-
ies does not correspond to this policy. If the ECB is
less a monetary institution than a ‘bad bank’ of
threatened national banking systems and a
financier of national debt and balance of payments
deficits, incurring considerable risks, an adjustment
of the voting and distribution of influence of the
capital and liability structures is absolutely neces-
sary. Equal voting rights regardless of the size, eco-
nomic weight and liability are only an invitation to
wrong decisions. The moral-hazard problems are
obvious!
The public dispute between ECB President Trichet
and former Bundesbank President Weber on the pur-
chase of government securities first focused atten-
tion on this issue. It is obvious that while the per-
sonal independence of the board members of the
ECB is legally shored up to a large extent by treaties
and statutes, it is hardly possibly to speak of politi-
cal independence since at least the nationally
appointed central bank presidents see themselves
also as representing the interests of their regions20
and since the ECB is very much involved in the deci-
sions of EU and euro political bodies. 
The ECB’s expansion of the purchase programme to
Italian and Spanish government bonds is for the
moment the final act of a series of mistakes. The pur-
chase is virtually an anticipation of the planned
expansion of the powers of the EFSF, which will
require the approval of the national parliaments. This
has absolutely nothing to do with monetary policy,
but is all about saving these countries high interest
costs. Thus, the ECB has made itself into a hand-
maiden of fiscal-policy interests and a front for poli-
cy-makers. This is underscored by the implicit request
of the French and German government immediately
prior to the ECB decision.
The risks assumed by the ECB and the fear of
revealing open losses, which would do additional
damage to the public reputation of the ECB, also
strongly influenced its conduct in the controversial
issue of whether and to what extent a debt reduc-
tion should be made for Greece and whether the
private banks should be protected in whole or in
part from the necessary write-downs. The position
taken by the ECB was interest-based and highly
partisan. At all costs it sought to avoid write-offs
and loss statements in its own balance sheet that
would reveal the true extent of its involvement in
the banking and government rescues. To this day
the ECB is not willing to admit that it has partici-
pated comprehensively in the financing of balance
of payments deficits and denies the problem of the
Target balances.
The ECB is thus a prisoner of its own bad decisions
and of the politicians that are seeking to rescue
Europe, and thus it continues to suffer losses of
independence, trust and reputation. For the politi-
cians who opposed a strong and independent central
bank and who only accepted this model in the
Maastricht Treaty under pressure from Germany,
this development is certainly not unwelcome.
Especially with the difficulties in which the mone-
tary union has fallen because of political mistakes
and failures, a strong and independent central bank
patterned after the Bundesbank21 is necessary.
Otherwise, the ECB’s policies will continue to be
derailed. 
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19 Asset-backed securities, which played an inglorious role in the
American banking crisis and which now have almost completely dis-
appeared from the markets, are experiencing a renaissance in the euro
area. They are deliberately created as a pledge for the ECB. Among
other things, the claims from the loans for purchases of players for
Spanish football clubs are to be financed via ECB securitisation.
20 A publication of the minutes and the voting results of the ECB
Governing Council is strongly recommended.
21 However, this also entails a European public opinion that backs
the ECB and that protects it from the attacks and impositions of pol-
icy-makers.CESifo Forum 2012 49
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Consequences
To achieve this it is necessary that in future the ECB
focus solely on actual monetary policy,22 that it solves
the problem of the Target balances, that it abandon its
role as the saviour of governments and banks and that
it rid its balance sheet of the various associated risks.
Such a clear break is only possible with the help of the
owners, who must assume the risks and losses
incurred either via the Luxemburg fund or directly via
the respective treasuries. That the national parlia-
ments must be involved is obvious. In the past the
ECB assumed risks without the consent of the nation-
al parliaments that will lead to losses that have to be
borne by the taxpayer.
The solution for the Target problem is found in the
American Federal Reserve System, as Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011) point out, i.e. in the annual
settlement of balances with assets between the partic-
ipating central banks. This is feasible for the future
new balances although very painful. The junkies in
the deficit countries will be deprived of the drug of
additional central bank money to finance their exter-
nal imbalances.
The settlement of the accrued old balances will be
much more difficult. At much more than roughly
450 billion euros23 they are significantly higher than
the funds that have been paid by the rescue schemes.
Given this astronomical sum, a solution will probably
only be possible via special measures, such as the
inclusion in the rescue plans, if the mobilised assets of
the NCBs (e.g. in Ireland) are not sufficient coverage,
which cannot be ruled out.
This would once again increase the volume of these
funds significantly, which is certainly not without
problems but has the advantage that the debt problem
as a whole would finally be exposed and a compre-
hensive solution must be sought. Only then can the
fiscal competence of parliaments and public confi-
dence be restored. A clear break and termination,
with fear and trembling, is much better than the cur-
rent never-ending fear and trembling. The fact that
the hitherto unsolved problem of the treatment of the
balances when a member leaves the monetary union is
mentioned only in passing.
Such a turnaround will not be easy to achieve, since
the previous beneficiaries of ECB policies will not
give up their advantages, especially with the Target
balances, without a fight. Germany, during the nego-
tiations for the intrinsically useful Target system,
apparently overlooked the abuse possibilities and
dangers. On the other hand, Germany as a potential
surplus and creditor country in a monetary union
cannot accept that such a cheap and automatic way
to finance balance of payments deficits continues to
its detriment. Otherwise the external imbalances are
likely to perpetuate and the collapse of the monetary
union is pre-programmed. An improperly designed
and managed European Monetary Union does not
promote the European idea and further integration
but endangers or destroys it. The sooner German
policy-makers recognize these problems and act, the
greater are the chances of success. This, however,
requires knowledge, courage and negotiating skills.
Wishful thinking and a falsely understood European
solidarity will only extend and further exacerbate the
problems. They are the real threat to the euro and
Europe!
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